Introduction
On April 20, 2010, the Transocean Deepwater Horizon suered a catastrophic blowout while drilling in a BP lease in the Gulf of Mexico's Macondo Prospect that resulted in the largest oil spill in U.S. history. Due to the ongoing spill and concerns about the safety of oshore oil drilling, the U.S. Department of the Interior suspended oshore deep water oil and gas drilling operations on May 27, 2010, in what became known as the oshore drilling moratorium. The media portrayed the impacts of these events on local employment, with closed sheries, idle rigs, as well as boats skimming oil and workers cleaning oiled beaches. This paper examines the net impact of the oil spill, spill response, and the drilling moratorium on employment and wages in the Gulf Coast. The spill and moratorium represented unexpected events in the Gulf Coast region. Coastal counties and parishes in this region were expected to bear the vast majority of the eects of these two events, while inland areas were expected to be largely unaected. The moratorium was expected to aect Louisiana with signicant support of the oshore drilling industry but not, for example, Florida, which had no active drilling o of its coastline. The timing and magnitude of the spill response varied across the states over the course of the spill as well.
These characteristics of the spill, spill response, and moratorium motivate an event study dierence-in-dierences strategy to estimate the impacts of these events on the local labor markets. In this framework, the spill, spill response, and moratorium are considered exogenous events that treat the coastal counties, as dened by their hydrologic characteristics by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, in the Gulf region. Given the surprise nature of these events, they can credibly be characterized as exogenous and hence the pre-event period should not include anticipatory behavior in the Gulf economy. I categorized ve Louisiana oil parishes identied by the U.S. government as most active in support of oshore drilling activities for treatment by the drilling moratorium.
To estimate the net eects of these events on employment and wages, I use monthly county/parish-level data (quarterly data for wages) from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). Figure 1 illustrates graphically the employment levels in the Louisiana oil parishes, the non-oil coastal parishes of Louisiana, counties on the Florida Gulf Coast, and the control (inland) counties in the Gulf States and identies the dates of the spill and the drilling moratorium. To facilitate comparisons over 2010, I have indexed total employment 2 for these four groups of counties such that they each equal 1.0 in January 2010.
Employment growth among these four groups follows a nearly identical trajectory through April 2010 and then a signicant divergence occurs. Florida Gulf Coast counties experience a signicant drop in employment from May through July and then begin to experience employment growth immediately after the capping of the well (July 15). The non-oil parishes on the Louisiana coast track quite closely the employment path of the inland counties throughout the spill. In contrast, the Louisiana oil parishes had eectively at employment throughout the spill and moratorium and avoided the decline in employment that aected these other Gulf Coast regions during May, June, and July of 2010.
In statistical analysis based on 2010 data, I nd that the net employment eect of the spill, spill response, and moratorium is a fairly precise zero for most parts of the Gulf Coast during 2010. In particular, the coastal counties of Texas, Mississippi, and the Florida Panhandle all experienced net job impacts that cannot be statistically distinguished from zero. Three Gulf Coast sub-regions experienced statistically signicant changes in employment. I nd that the most oil-intensive parishes in Louisiana witnessed a 1.2% increase in employment (95% condence interval, 0.4 to 2.0%), and the Alabama coastal counties experienced a 1.3% increase in employment as well. In contrast, the Non-Panhandle Florida counties on the Gulf Coast experienced a 2.7% decrease in employment (95% condence interval, -1.9 to -3.5%).
Complementing these employment impacts, I nd that the Louisiana oil parishes experienced a statistically signicant increase in the average wage of about 2%. Likewise, the Alabama coastal counties enjoyed higher wages of about 4 to 6% during the spill. The rest of the Gulf Coast counties and parishes experienced economically small and statistically insignicant impacts on wages.
I undertook an array of robustness checks of the base econometric model. Second, I estimated the impacts of the spill on the number of business establishments, and found statistically signicant increases of 1-5% for Louisiana oil parishes and non-oil Louisiana coastal parishes across an array of specications, while Alabama, Mississippi, and all of Gulf Coast Florida experienced statistically signicant declines in the count of establishments. Third, I investigated worker migration using IRS tax statistics, but found no statistically signicant impacts of these events on net migration. Fourth, I analyzed parish-specic sales tax data for Louisiana and found a statistically signicant increase of 11% in sales tax revenues in the Louisiana oil parishes. Fifth, I investigated quarterly air travel passenger arrivals by airport in the Gulf Coast states, which provides some evidence of lower air passenger arrivals in Florida Gulf Coast airports than other airports during this time. I also provide evidence of the magnitude of the spill response, the positive impact of initial compensation claims on employment, and the very small take-up of benets available through the rig worker assistance fund to further illustrate the net labor market impacts of these events.
The next section synthesizes the relevant literature on local labor market shocks and describes the predicted labor market impacts reported in the media during the spill and moratorium in 2010. The third section outlines the empirical strategy. Section four presents the empirical results for the base models for employment and wages, followed by an extensive array of robustness and external validity checks. The nal section concludes. 4 2 Predicted Labor Market Impacts of the Spill and Drilling Moratorium
Local Labor Market Shocks
The local labor markets literature highlights the expected outcomes of an adverse shock to labor demand such as the shutting down of a shery due to an oil spill or a drilling moratorium. A negative demand shock should decrease wages and increase unemployment and, with time, result in out-migration of workers, who seek better wages elsewhere (Blanchard et al., 1992) . The impact on rms could be mixed, with the initial demand shock causing some rm exit, but the wage readjustment process leading to in-migration of rms that seek out low-cost labor and eventually mitigate some of the impact of the negative shock. Due to the dynamics of migrating workers and rms, Topel (1986) nds that a transitory shock is likely to have a more pronounced impact on wages than a permanent shock.
A positive demand shock such as a large spill clean-up eort should increase wages, reduce unemployment, and result in net in-migration of workers.
The positive shock to economic activity could result in short-run rm entry, although higher wages could discourage long-run entry. In light of worker migration, the increase in employment under a positive labor demand shock could reect more jobs for residents and/or more jobs for migrants. 1 Enrico (2011) 's assessment of the local labor market literature notes that empirical evidence on this question is mixed.
While the theoretical and empirical literature have been motivated by and focused on a wide array of local labor market shocks, of particular relevance to the analysis in this paper is the impact of Hurricane Katrina, one of the most destructive and deadly hurricanes to strike the Gulf Coast, on the region's labor markets. In the months following the storm, payroll employment fell by more than one-third in New Orleans (Groen and Polivka, 2008) . The number of business establishments in Orleans Parish fell nearly 20% in the two years after the hurricane (Vigdor, 2008) . Yet, in contrast to the oil spill, which primarily shocked demand, Katrina adversely impacted labor supply and demand. Vigdor (2008) notes that the higher wages and relatively low unemployment a year after the storm suggests that the reduction in labor supply dominated the decline 1 During the 2010 oil spill, some Gulf Coast political leaders complained that spill response jobs went to non-residents. 5 in labor demand. In analysis of individual income tax return data, Deryugina et al. (2014) nd that the gap in wage earnings between Katrina victims and the control group had closed by 2007, and non-employment dierences had likewise closed by 2009. In light of these ndings, in the regression models that control for seasonality presented below, I focus on panels over the 2008-2010 period (as opposed to longer panels) to minimize Katrina eects in my statistical models.
Since theory cannot unambiguously resolve the net eect of simultaneous positive and negative demand shocks in a local labor market, I focus on an empirical analysis of the impact of the spill, spill response, and moratorium on the Gulf Coast labor markets. If the adverse shocks (spill and moratorium) dominate the positive shock (spill response), then I would expect a decline in employment and wages, as well as out-migration and, in the short run, fewer business establishments. Before turning to the empirical framework and analysis, I present some evidence of the potential scope of adverse labor market impacts predicted in spring and summer 2010 during the spill and drilling moratorium.
Predicted Labor Market Impacts of the Spill
In the weeks after the Deepwater Horizon sank to the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico, analysts and politicians began to predict the potential employment impacts of the spill. In May 2010, the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank identied about 130,000 jobs at risk from the spill in the forestry/shing, arts/entertainment/recreation, and accommodation and food services industries in the Gulf States (Chriszt and Hammill, 2010) . An economist at the University of Central Florida estimated that 39,000 (195,000) jobs could be lost in Florida if the spill caused a 10% (50%) decline in tourism (Harrington, 2010) . The spill adversely impacted local employment through the closing of state and federal Gulf sheries and by discouraging some tourists from vacationing on the Gulf Coast that summer (Aldy, 2011) .
Some early evidence suggested that regional tourism, especially in Florida, would bear adverse impacts from the spill. Oxford Economics (2010) Economics also reported that a June 2010 survey found that 10% of households intending to travel to the Gulf Coast for vacation had changed their plans as a result of the oil spill. Oxford Economics (2010) estimated a reduction in tourism revenues by 12% in the rst year after the beginning of the spill.
Predicted Labor Market Impacts of the Drilling Moratorium
Within a week of the U.S. government's announcement of the May 27 drilling moratorium, representatives of the oil and gas industry highlighted potentially large employment losses (see Table 1 ). The Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association identied potential job losses in excess of 30,000 (Louisiana Workforce Commission, 2010). In June, several economists at Louisiana State University independently estimated moratorium-related job losses in the range of 10,000 20,000 for the state of Louisiana (Dismukes, 2010; Mason, 2010; Richardson, 2010) . The U.S. government also employed regional multiplier models in two analyses: an internal Department of Interior assessment in July reportedly estimated job losses in excess of 23,000 (Power and Eaton, 2010) while an interagency working group report published in September estimated job losses in the 8,000 12,000 range (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010).
Senator Mary Landrieu of Louisiana stated that the moratorium could cost more jobs than the spill itself (Condon, 2010) . John Hofmeister, the former CEO of Shell, stated that 50,000 people could lose their jobs (Desel, 2010) .
The head of one Florida-based investment rm wrote in his oil spill blog that an extended moratorium. . . will cost up to 200,000 higher-paying jobs in the oil drilling and service business and that the employment multiplier of 4.7 will put the total job loss at nearly 1 million permanent employment shrinkage over the next few years (Kotok, 2010) .
The pre-spill employment data can put these moratorium job loss estimates in context. First, about 9,000 rig workers worked on projects in the Gulf of The May 27, 2010 oshore drilling moratorium was also an unexpected event.
In 2009, a bipartisan energy bill passed the Senate Energy and Natural Re- The economic impacts of the spill, spill response, and moratorium varied within and among the Gulf States. Figure 2 illustrates the coastal and inland counties for each of the ve Gulf States as well as the location of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Coastal counties and parishes in this region bore the vast majority of the eects of these events, while inland areas were largely unaected.
The moratorium was expected to aect select Louisiana parishes with significant support of the oshore drilling industry but not Florida, which had no active drilling o of its coastline. These spatial and temporal characteristics of the spill and moratorium motivate the empirical framework. I use a dierence-in-dierences strategy to estimate the impacts of the spill, spill response, and moratorium on employment and wages. In this framework, the spill, spill response, and moratorium are considered exogenous events that treat coastal counties in the Gulf region (see Table 2 ). Given the surprise nature of these events, they can credibly be characterized as exogenous and hence the pre-event period should not include anticipatory behavior in the Gulf economy (i.e., relocating shing vessels to the Atlantic coast in anticipation of the spill or relocating drilling rigs to another region in anticipation of the moratorium Dismukes (2010) estimates that nearly three-quarters of the economic impacts of the moratorium would be borne by these ve parishes in his multiplier analysis for Louisiana. through October 2010. 4 For the control group, I employ all non-coastal counties and parishes in these ve states. Table 3 presents summary statistics on the number of coastal and inland counties by Gulf State as well as average employment, weekly wage, and establishment counts.
Formally, I specify the following regression equations:
in which y represents one of two labor market outcomes: (a) total employment for county i in month t, and (b) average weekly wage in 2010 dollars for county i in quarter t; 5 α represents county xed eects, δ represents month- The appendix table lists Gulf Coast counties within each treatment category. 5 I also employ the quarterly-based specication for establishment count analyses in the robustness checks below. 6 For the wage and establishment count analyses, these indicators take the value of 1 for 2010 quarter 3. The spill began in week four of the second quarter, and the moratorium began in week nine of the second quarter. Given this timing and the likely lag for wage adjustment, I specify the wage and establishment count models such that the net treatment of spill, response, and moratorium are assumed to occur in 2010q3. tered by county/parish to account for potential serial correlation in the data (Bertrand et al., 2004) .
To implement this model, I employ QCEW monthly county/parish-level employment and quarterly county/parish-level wage data (BLS, nd). The BLS and state employment security agencies compile monthly employment and quarterly wage and establishment data for workers covered by various unemployment insurance programs, and hence is eectively a measure of employment provided by employers. It does not include data on the self-employed, proprietors, armed forces, domestic workers, and railroad workers. This dataset only permits an investigation of employment levels; it does not include data on labor force participation, unemployment, or unemployment rates. 7 In addition, the QCEW provides employment and wage data, for some counties and parishes in this region, by sector and industry, and I use these data to investigate industry-specic labor market impacts in the robustness checks. Table 4 presents the employment results for estimating equations 1-3. Equation 1, which permits an examination of a common treatment of the spill, spill response, and moratorium on all coastal counties and parishes, shows fairly precise zero impacts for the Gulf Coast counties. The estimated coecient cannot be distinguished from zero and the 95% condence interval ranges from about a 7/10 of 1% decline to a 1/10 of 1% increase in employment.
Results

2010 Panel Analyses of Employment and Wages
The model in column 2 allows for dierential impacts for the ve oil-intensive parishes of Louisiana and for the rest of the Gulf Coast counties. This model eectively focuses on the treatment of spill, spill response, and moratorium on the oil-intensive parishes and the treatment of spill and spill response on the rest of the Gulf Coast region, which had little economic activity that could be impacted by the oshore drilling moratorium. Not surprisingly, the non-oil Gulf Coast counties show similar impacts as the entire Gulf Coast in column 1 results. The oil parishes exhibit a statistically signicant employment increase of 1.2%. 7 While the Current Population Survey's Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) provides such information at the county-by-month level, the LAUS data are imputed for most counties and months, in contrast to the QCEW count data.
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The model in column 3 provides even greater exibility in estimating the impacts of treatment by the spill, spill response, and moratorium by allowing for eects to vary by state and sub-state region, including the Louisiana oil parishes.
The results in column 3 illustrate a statistically signicant 1.2% employment gain in the Louisiana oil parishes, a statistically signicant 1.3% employment gain in Alabama coastal counties, and a statistically signicant 2.7% employment decline in Non-Panhandle Florida Gulf Coast counties. Based on average 2009 employment levels in these three regions, these statistically signicant estimated impacts translate into about 3,000 more jobs in the oil parishes, 3,000 more jobs in the Alabama coastal counties, and 50,000 fewer jobs in the Florida coastal counties reecting the net eects of the spill, spill response, and moratorium. 
Robustness: Seasonality
To address the concern that the results presented above reect regular seasonal variations in labor markets, I expanded the analyses to include a longer panel (2008) (2009) (2010) and allowed for month (quarter) xed eects to vary between coastal and non-coastal regions as well as by state. Table 5 presents the employment impacts for these seasonality robustness checks and includes the model from column 3 in Table 4 for reference.
While the oil parishes exhibit a statistically signicant employment increase of 1 2% in the 2010 panels (columns 1, 3, and 5), the longer panels show fairly precise zeroes for the oil parishes (columns 2, 4, and 6). Table 5 (columns 1, 3, 5, and 6). With longer panels, Texas coastal counties appear to experience statistically signicant employment gains ranging between 1.5 and 2.0% for the 2008-2010 panel. 
Robustness: National Controls
The primary empirical strategy in this paper rests on the assumption that the non-coastal counties and parishes in the Gulf Coast region are not impacted by the spill, spill response, or moratorium and thus can serve as controls in the regressions. Given the close proximity many of these counties and parishes have to the treated coastal region, there may be a risk that the controls are aected by changes in economic activity in the treatment region. For example, if a worker lost her job in a treatment county and relocated to a control county where she took on a new job, then we would have a case in which the employment status of the individual is unchanged but this empirical framework would estimate a delta of -2 for employment (for treatment employment minus control employment during the treatment period). In a similar way, if a worker quits a job in a control county so he can move to a treatment county and participate in spill response, then this approach would again show a change in employment (in this case a delta of +2) despite the fact that the employment status for the worker in question is unchanged.
To address this possible concern, I run the base regressions with a modied 
Robustness: Omit Texas
Texas counties represent about 48% of the sample in the Gulf State statistical analyses. Texas may not have experienced much of an impact from the oil spill, since the spill occurred southeast of the boot of Louisiana and the vast majority of the oil moved to the east and north from the leaking well. To address the concern that the Texas counties coastal and inland may not be appropriate for inclusion in these statistical analyses, I have run the base regressions with a four-state Gulf sample that omits coastal and inland counties of Texas. 
Robustness: Denition of Coastal
The base regressions employ the NOAA denition of a coastal county or parish in the Gulf States. I have also employed a more narrow denition that requires a county or parish to meaningfully border the Gulf of Mexico. In these analyses, 
External Validity: Industry-Specic Impacts
To complement the analyses of total employment and wages, I have also estimated equation 3 with industry-specic data for the support activities for mining (NAICS 213, which includes drilling oil and gas wells NAICS 213111) and accommodation (NAICS 721) industries. These industry-specic analyses permit further investigation of the impacts of the spill, spill response, and moratorium on directly aected industries. While additional industries, such as shing (NAICS 1141), water transportation (NAICS 483), oil and gas drilling (NAICS 211) would certainly be of interest for this kind of analysis, the censoring of the public domain county-level employment data renders these panels much too small (3, 20, and 62 counties, respectively, out of 534 in the region). Table 9 presents the estimated employment and wage impacts for the support activities for mining and accommodation industries. As a result of data censoring, the models for support activities for mining industry exclude 
External Validity: Establishment Count
The QCEW provides quarterly counts on the number of business establishments in each county. I employ equation (3) and replicate the specications as reported in Table 6 on wages with the natural logarithm of the establishment count as the dependent variable. Table 10 presents the results for these specications with quarter, quarter-by-coastal, and quarter-by-state xed eects (in addition to county xed eects) for 2010 and 2008-2010 panels. As in the wage regressions, the third quarter of 2010 is considered the treated quarter in these statistical analyses.
In all specications, non-oil Louisiana coastal parishes experience statistically signicant increases in the establishment count, ranging from about 0.5 to 4%. In all but one specication, the Louisiana oil parishes likewise experience statistically signicant increases of about 1 to 4%. In all specications, Panhandle Florida and Non-Panhandle Florida experience statistically signicant declines in establishment count of about 1 to 2% in the former and about 2 to 4% in the latter. In a majority of specications, Alabama and Mississippi coastal counties also experience statistically signicant declines in establishment count, 3 and 1%, respectively.
The net positive impacts of these events on Louisiana business establishments is consistent with the zero to positive impacts on employment and wages for the two Louisiana regions in nearly all specications. Likewise, the adverse impact on Non-Panhandle Florida coastal business establishments squares with the nding of a decline in employment across virtually all statistical models.
External Validity: Migration
The standard models of local labor markets suggest that a negative (positive) shock that decreases (increases) wages will result in out-migration (inmigration). To investigate the potential impacts of the spill, spill response, and 11 The dierence-in-dierences estimator using parish-level data to 9 This analysis focuses on Louisiana and Florida because of the distinctive impacts of the spill, response, and moratorium on these two states and the availability of public use sales tax data.
10 Technically, the 4% state general sales tax consists of a 3.97% state sales tax and a 0.03% Louisiana Tourism Promotion District sales tax. The revenue data presented covers only the state sales tax; it does not include parish or city-established sales tax revenues. 11 A Wald test of the hypothesis thatβ =γ is rejected at the 1% level, andγ is statistically signicant at the 1% level. 19 compare the before and after time periods yields a statistically signicant 11% increase in sales tax revenue for the oil parishes relative to the inland parishes.
The State of Florida reports county sales tax data on a monthly basis. 12 I use gross sales subject to the state sales tax in a specication similar to (4): (5) in which sales represents gross sales subject to the state sales tax for county i in month t; α represents county xed eects; δ represents month and year xed eects; and the other indicator functions were dened above. Given the seasonal nature of Florida tourism, I estimate equation (5) To evaluate the potential impacts of the oil spill on commercial air travel, I estimate the following regressions: (7) in which pass represents the total number of arrivals for airport i in quarter t; α represents airport xed eects; δ represents quarter-year xed eects; the 
External Validity: Spill Response Labor Mobilization
The unprecedented mobilization of spill response resources including more than 800 specialized skimmers, 120 aircraft, 8,000 vessels, and nearly 50,000 responders (Aldy, 2011) provided employment opportunities that could counter the potential adverse eects of the spill and the moratorium. While many of these responders represented workers relocating temporarily to address the spill, some were local displaced workers. For example, shermen who faced closed state and federal sheries during the spill could participate in the Ves- BP allocated the $100 million to the Baton Rouge Area Foundation, which was responsible for designing and implementing the assistance fund. The RWAF made grants, ranging from $3,000 to $30,000, available to individuals who had 14 Feyrer and Sacerdote employ political instruments based on the seniority of Congressional delegations in their stimulus analyses. There is no obvious analog to the oil spill. 15 The average county-level per capita compensation payments are comparable across the Alabama coast, Florida panhandle, and Louisiana coast (oil and non-oil parishes). Payments are about a factor of three lower in the Mississippi coast, and an order of magnitude lower in the Non-Panhandle Florida gulf coast counties and the Texas coast. Inland compensation payments are, on average, three orders of magnitude smaller. been working on deepwater drilling rigs as of May 6, 2010 and had lost their jobs. The RWAF took a rst round of applications in September 2010 and paid out grants totaling $5.6 million to 347 workers. To put these claims for lost jobs in context, 347 rig workers would sta less than two deepwater drilling rigs like the Deepwater Horizon.
The RWAF opened a second round in the Spring of 2011 to provide grants to those individuals who lost their jobs in a position that supported deepwater drilling rigs, such as shipyard workers, caterers, drilling support operations, etc.
In this second round, the RWAF paid out about $5.8 million to 408 workers. 
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The various statistical models illustrate either statistically signicant increases in employment in the oil parishes (2010 panel) and the non-oil coastal parishes (2008-2010 panel) or small eects (point estimates < |0.5%|) that are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Figure 3 presents the estimated employment impacts for each coastal region based on the 2010 panel model (Table 5, The results of these statistical analyses for the Louisiana parishes dier signicantly from the predictions made with various state and regional multiplier models employed to assess the impacts of the drilling moratorium. A number of analysts quickly undertook multiplier analysis of the moratorium after its announcement. None of these analysts employed their modeling tools to evaluate the employment and economic activity impacts of the spill itself or the spill response. Figure 4 presents the estimated combined employment impacts for all Louisiana coastal parishes (oil parishes and the non-oil parishes) based on the estimated 2010 and 2008-2010 panel models (Table 5 , columns 1 and 2).
The net eect of the spill, spill response, and drilling moratorium resulted in a statistically signicant increase of about 6,400 20,000 in coastal Louisiana employment relative to the counterfactual. All of the predicted negative im-16 A casual comparison of the oil parishes (treated by spill, spill response, and moratorium) to the non-oil Louisiana coastal parishes (treated by spill and spill response) would result in an inconclusive assessment of the incremental impact of the moratorium. In some statistical models, the comparison would suggest that the drilling moratorium increased jobs and other models would yield the opposite conclusion. In virtually all wage models, the comparison would suggest a net positive impact of the moratorium on labor compensation. The more likely outcome is that the intensity of spill response activity centered more on the oil parishes than non-oil parishes and the moratorium, as evident in the limited take-up of benets available through the Rig Worker Assistance Fund, had little economic impact. pacts on employment from the published 2010 analyses fall outside the 95% condence intervals of these models. The estimated employment losses in the ex ante multiplier models, in comparison to employment gains in the ex post statistical analysis and for that matter, simple graphical analysis in Figure 1 suggests several shortcomings of the multiplier tools. First, the ceteris paribus assumption made in the drilling moratorium multiplier analyses did not appro- These results yield several policy implications. First, a signicant pulse of resources in spill response appears to oset much of the adverse impacts of the spill. This is not a determination that the optimal level of spill response was pursued, but to simply note that the spill response delivers an array of immediate and longer-term economic and environmental benets. In other words, spill response represents a kind of economic stimulus that creates employment opportunities, not unlike conventional scal stimulus. Second, the ambiguity about the length of the drilling moratorium may have mitigated some of the adverse impacts of the drilling moratorium. Throughout what was originally billed as a 6-month moratorium, Department of the Interior ocials noted that it could end early (and in fact, the moratorium ended more than one month early). This uncertainty may have created an incentive for rig owners to wait, not unlike how uncertainty associated with an irreversible investment can create value in waiting for new information. Third, multiplier analyses that do not characterize the complexity and temporal attributes of an economic shock may be uninformative and potentially biased for policy deliberations. To be fair, multiplier models provide analysts with a tool to conduct ex ante analysis premised on a few assumptions about the economic environment that is, by denition, not available through ex post statistical analysis of employment and wage data. Just as scientic models of the fate of oil spilled from the Macondo Prospect would deliver misleading predictions if they failed to account for skimming, dispersant applications, deepwater containment, boom deployment, and other means of mitigating the eects of the spill, economic models that, by as-26 sumption, fail to account for the economic and employment impacts of response activities would also produce misleading predictions. Finally, the net positive labor market impacts in the regions exposed to the most substantial clean-up activity and the net negative labor market impacts in those regions with the least clean-up activity illustrate how a rapid, signicant infusion of resources in response to a labor market shock, such as a natural or human-caused disaster, can mitigate the shock's adverse impacts to labor income and participation. https://web.archive.org/web/20100923042450/http: //gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/GCCF_Overall_Status_Report_ 09-21-2010.pdf. GCCF (2012 http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/workinglife/ tracking-oil-spill-job-losses-a-slippery-task/1103427. Kotok, D. (2010) Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by county. All models include xed eects by county and month (or quarter). ***, **, * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. (2008-2010 panel) . Each sample includes 534 counties/parishes. ***, **, * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. month, and year (2008-2010 panel) . Each sample includes 534 counties/parishes. ***, **, * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. (2008-2010 panel) . ***, **, * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. 2008-2010 panel) . ***, **, * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Region ln(establishments) ln(establishments) ln(establishments) ln(establishments) ln(establishments) ln(establishments) Oil Parishes 0.0080*** 0.039*** 0.0020 0.038*** 0.0087*** 0.040*** (0.0018) (0.0036) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0017) (0.0036) LA Coast ex Oil Parishes 0.0097*** 0.040*** 0.0054*** 0.041*** 0.011*** 0.040*** (0.0022) (0.0037) (0.0020) (0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0037) AL Coast -0.0017 -0.030*** -0.0076*** -0.031*** 0.00073 -0.029*** (0.0022) (0.0050) (0.0029) (0.0050) (0.0020) (0.0050) FL Panhandle Coast -0.0099*** -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.0083*** -0.020*** (0.0032) (0.0048) (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0031) (0.0048) FL Non-Panhandle Coast -0.019*** -0.037*** -0.025*** -0.037*** -0.018*** -0.036*** (0.0045) (0.0070) (0.0047) (0.0070) (0.0044) (0.0069) MS Coast -0.00014 -0.011** -0.0061* -0.012** -0.00027 -0.011** (0.0027) (0.0051) (0.0032) (0.0052) (0.0028) (0.0051) TX Coast 0.00064 0.0090* -0.0053* 0.0083 -0.00032 0.0083 (0.0026) (0.0052) (0.0030) (0.0053) (0.0027) (0.0052) Sample Period 2010 2008 2008 2008 2008 Quarter Quarter-by-Coastal Quarter-by-State N 1,602 5,874 1,602 5,874 1,602 5,874 Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by county. All models include xed eects by county and quarter (2010 panel) or county, quarter, and year (2008-2010 panel) . Each sample includes 534 counties/parishes. ***, **, * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. 
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